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Anyone seeking a comprehensive account of the hedge fund industry from its inception
down to the present will derive profit, but only limited profit, from Sebastian Mallabyʼs latest
book. The same holds true for those in search of a discussion of the economic significance of
hedge funds completely uncontaminated by polemic. For More Money Than God, as the
hyperbole of its title indicates, is a work of high-quality financial journalism, one that has the
weaknesses as well as the strengths of a quasi-insiderʼs view. Mallabyʼs extensive experience as
a reporter for The Economist and The Washington Post, and his current position at a leading
Washington think-tank, the Council on Foreign Relations, mean that he has had a ringside seat
from which to observe the key economic events of the past two decades. At the same time,
intimate involvement with his subject makes detached and systematic reflection difficult;
Mallaby genuinely tries to remain objective, but he is a self-acknowledged hedge fund partisan
and it is difficult to avoid concluding that his affection for them is rooted not least in the
entertainment value they provide. The rather breathless tone of the book suggests an
overmastering urgency at work; there is a compelling story to tell, one that Mallaby has no
wish to see cut short by regulatory interference. A defense of hedge funds must be mounted,
and time is pressing.
The story-telling first. The structure of the book is broadly chronological, with each of the
first six chapters devoted to describing one of the formative hedge funds, its creator(s) and
offspring. Thereafter the approach becomes more episodic, a journey through the crises in
which hedge funds have figured prominently during the past twenty years. Mallaby breaks off
to describe some of the companies which led the hedge fund renaissance of the new
millennium, before returning to bring his narrative to a close with an account of the lead-up to
the Great Recession of 2008 and the cataclysm itself.
What shape is there, if any, to this story? There are the obvious themes of the vast
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expansion in the size and influence of hedge funds, and the increasingly diverse nature of their
activities. But this immediately provokes the reader to ask whether their nature has not
changed so radically over time as to render the term ʻhedge fundʼ itself virtually meaningless.
Mallaby rightly attempts to deal with the problem of defining his central concept at the outset,
but his success is partial at best. He argues that the vehicle created by Alfred Winslow Jones,
the founding father of the industry, had four essential features that nearly all its successors
were to replicate: a (very large) performance fee; the avoidance of official regulation insofar as
that was possible; a balance between being ʻlongʼ in some stocks and ʻshortʼ in others; and the
ʻleveragingʼ of bets on the performance of stocks with borrowed money (p. 2). It is only the third
of these features, of course, which seems indispensible to the management of risk and so would
make a hedge fund seem appealing to even the most cautious of investors. Yet it was ʻcasually
discardedʼ by George Soros, the most famous/notorious hedge fund manager of them all (p. 91)
― nor was he by any means single in this.
The ʻhedgingʼ element appears to be largely fictional in any case. Its essential premise and
promise, that whether the market rises or falls the fund will return a profit, is far too grandiose
a claim to be widely credible; it implies that risk can, in fact, be eliminated. If this seems too
good to be true, the facts adduced here prove that this is indeed the case, even accepting that
the information Mallaby provides is incomplete because too great a focus on failure might
disenchant the reader. Clearly, from the very outset, hedge funds have never proved
themselves immune to downturns in the market; as an economic life-form, they seem by their
nature prone to periodic mass extinctions. Mallabyʼs allusions to the culls of 1968-74 (pp. 40-41),
1994 (pp. 182, 191) and 2000 (pp. 262-264), and his rather more detailed account of some of the
casualties of the turmoil of 2008, point to the irresistible conclusion that hedge funds in general
have failed to foresee and ride out crises−even though, as late as 2009, investors continued to
believe that they should and would (p. 371). Yet if they have not in fact abolished risk, or even
managed it with consistent success, what have they been doing with their time and energy?
The answer is, in some cases at least, making vast sums of money in astonishingly short
order. A. W. Jones christened his brainchild a ʻhedged fundʼ and vehemently but unavailingly
objected to the removal of the final ʻdʼ when the term was popularized; Mallaby acknowledges
that he himself has gone one step further by dropping the initial ʻhʼ as well (p. 5). What truly
fascinate him are ʻedgeʼ funds, the ones that have seemed able, for a while at least, to beat the
market in spectacular fashion. The relatively few individuals who have acquired sudden and
dizzying wealth thereby dominate swathes of the book (they constitute the ʻnew eliteʼ of its
subtitle). Mallaby is not, in fact, particularly concerned with the generality of hedge funds−
which is perhaps the severest limitation of his study. In pursuit of good ʻcopyʼ, his spotlight falls
repeatedly on men who have seemed able to generate immense profits year after year, and he
cannot refrain from the inevitable question, ʻhow did they do it?ʼ (pp. 109-111). Is there some
formula for success that has characterized these ʻhigh performance clustersʼ?
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Mallaby wisely refrains from trying to provide a single, simple answer to this question.
None of the ʻtitansʼ of the industry was blessed with exact foreknowledge of events; at best they
were all, in their own different ways, much quicker to acquire information or sense opportunity
than their peers. Furthermore, limited as their individual talents may have been, these were
well adapted to their times and circumstances−up to a point. Some, like Julian Robertson of
Tiger Management, were adept and ultra-confident stock-pickers, or in the case of A. W. Jones
himself, managers of stock pickers. They were able, for a time anyway, to incentivize and infuse
their subordinates with an esprit de corps that made them seem invincible. Others, like Michael
Steinhardt and Paul Tudor Jones II, were successful students of market psychology, taking
advantage of their insights to identify market ʻwavesʼ and adopt strategies to exploit them,
based either on contrarianism or on a feeling for how other market players would react in a
given situation. Being first in the field also gave some hedge funds a temporary institutional
ʻ edge ʼ−part of Steinhardt ʼ s profits, for example, came from block trading, i. e. providing
liquidity where others had not yet seen the opportunity. Sometimes this shaded into illegality;
A. W. Jones flirted with insider dealing on occasion, while Steinhardt almost certainly engaged
in substantial collusive trading - claims of a type that continue to be made against hedge funds
today (e. g. Lattman and Ahmed, 2011). Luck, too, played its part (e. g. pp. 38, 47-48, 92, 120), but
Mallaby is right to insist that it cannot provide anything like a complete explanation. More
important, he argues, was the ability to spot and exploit market inefficiencies that allowed for
the laying of huge asymmetrical bets, most notoriously on currencies. These were especially
lucrative since the counterparties were central banks and governments whose understanding
of the market was often woeful; the victory of Soros and Druckenmiller over the Bank of
England and Norman Lamont on 16 September, 1992, ʻBlack Wednesdayʼ, remains the perfect
specimen of the type.
Mallaby has much less time for the generality of hedge fund managers. But these mere
mortals can take comfort from the fact that none of the ʻtitansʼ proved able to master the
market or the art of risk-taking completely or indefinitely, and a large part of the interest of
studying elite hedge funds lies in seeking to understand their limitations. Mallabyʼs book is of
considerable help in cataloging these. It is clear from his case studies that all hedge fund gurus,
each in their own different way, have fallen victim to their own success; this is partly a matter
of hubris that betrays them into folly, partly the simple loss of ʻedgeʼ as their protégés defect
(taking with them the proprietary formula for success and setting up for themselves), and
partly burnout. Thus Julian Hart Robinson was seduced into diversifying from U. S. equities,
where he had considerable expertise and where his long-term approach had made him a
fortune in the 1980s, into macro-trading (of currencies in particular ) where this approach
invited disaster in the 1990s ( pp. 122-127, 248-252 ). Mallaby seems right to argue that
Robertson threw caution to the winds primarily out of the desire to best Soros, just as Soros
himself lost heavily in Indonesia and Russia in pursuit of an unrealizable ambition to be
recognized as a ʻ statesman-philanthropist ʼ ( pp. 207-209, 212-219 ). Generational change is
another force that eats away at the foundations of a successful hedge fund. Young and
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ambitious juniors, becoming increasingly frustrated, decide to strike out on their own, and their
mentors are powerless to restrain them, as A. W. Jones discovered early on (pp. 35-36) - the
only partially successful strategy for circumventing this rule seems to be teamwork culture of
Renaissance Technologies (pp. 303-306). But often the founding father is not unhappy to see his
disciples go, because running a hedge fund is ultimately debilitating; the landscape is littered
with extinct volcanoes. Even the greatest eventually burn out and retire, often disenchanted,
the life sucked out of them: the roster here includes A. W. Jones (p. 35), Steinhardt (pp. 190-191),
Robertson (p. 262), and Druckenmiller (p. 264). Even Soros, the ultimate prizefighter, could not
sustain the punishment indefinitely, and took extended periods of leave from the ring (pp. 87,
149-50, 264).
Stories of the excess and chastisement of the powerful are, of course, the stuff of
journalism, but Mallaby, in his concluding chapter, seeks to shift the focus from individuals to
the making of policy. On the merits and demerits of hedge funds in general and on one of the
burning issues of the moment, how and how far they should be regulated, his argument is that,
the very largest of them aside, lightness of touch is the wisest policy. On balance, he claims,
these funds do more economic good than harm. He absolves ʻgenuineʼ, i. e. independent, hedge
funds of most of the responsibility for the ongoing Great Recession. For him, it was the funds
located inside banks (and especially the great merchant banks) who were the true villains of the
piece (together with AIG, which took ineptitude to an entirely new plane). These internal funds,
he argues, bore the stamp of bank culture rather than hedge-fund culture; they lacked the
independence from regulatory and ratings agencies, the exclusive focus on their business, and
the paranoia about margin calls that, Mallaby believes, preserved real hedge funds from the
suicidal risk-taking that brought down Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and others.
The latter do not, admittedly, constitute a very high bar, and Mallaby can seem at times to
engage in special pleading in favor of the independent hedge fund. Yet his basic reading of the
crisis of 2007-2009 aligns with those of Andrew Ross Sorkin and Michael Lewis. They too see
its major institutional casualties as largely the authors of their own demise. Sorkin has little
sympathy with those like Dick Fuld, CEO of Lehman Brothers, who tried to portray their
companies as hedge fund victims (Sorkin, pp. 96-105). Lewis is even more scathing in detailing
how, to take perhaps the most egregious example, Howie Hublerʼs adventure into the brave
new world of the CDS cost his employer, Morgan Stanley, an estimated $9 billion (Lewis, pp.
200-215). It is worth noting in passing that Lewis adds a moral dimension to the tale of fund
operators like Steve Eisner and Michael Burry (neither of whom figures in Mallabyʼs book) who
worked to unmask the folly of Hubler and his employers. Lewis takes the defense of such funds
one step further by asserting that the behavior of Bear Stearns, Lehman, Morgan Stanley and
others of their ilk in the bond market was not merely incompetent but essentially corrupt, and
that in dragging this into the light of day (and, in the process, profiting very handsomely) funds
like Cornwall Capital were doing the work of justice (Lewis, pp. 233-234, 242-251). Mallaby also
has little time for the view that the ʻshortsʼ need regulating because they somehow unfairly
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conspired to bring down Lehman and others; he, too, believes that their role as the shock troops
of the free market considerably outweighs any shortcomings they might have. But his principal
argument for leaving them alone is that far from being too big to fail, they are too small to
warrant much regulation. The claim that they are simply not at present systemically important
places Mallaby firmly in alignment with other hedge fund apologists like Richard Baker,
president of the Managed Funds Association, for example (Ahmed, 2011). The evidence of the
past, even of the collapse of the inappropriately-named Long Term Capital Management in
1998, Mallaby argues, shows that hedge funds can be allowed to fail without the cost being
passed on to the taxpayer. That being so, as the standard bearers and, on occasion, the saviors
of modern capitalism (pp. 317-322, 363-371), they are worth two cheers at least.
All of which sounds reassuring. And yet, if we are to believe Nouriel Roubini and Stephen
Mihm, it will still not prove sufficient next time; future disasters there will be, for ʻfar from
being the exception, crises are the norm ʼ (Crisis Economics, 4 ). On this view regulators,
charged with both creating a framework of rules and taking the lead in responding to crises,
face a seemingly impossible task, and Mallabyʼs book offers one obvious reason why; the clear
and simple fact that the future will not resemble the past, a fact this is more than usually true of
hedge funds. But, whatever limitations regulators may face, a full appreciation of the protean
nature of hedge funds can only help those charged with supervising them. These funds have
changed, and their changing has been rapid and constant. That will continue. Which means
that regulators need to ask themselves; what will such funds look like in five years time? Or
ten? Or twenty? This is effectively asking how one should try to regulate the unknown, it is
true, but it is still a very worthwhile question. For Mallaby shows beyond fear of contradiction
that hedge funds have metamorphosed with such alarming rapidity over the past sixty years
that regulators have always been playing catch-up, not least because of the culture of secrecy
that seems to be part of the hedge fund DNA. Regulators, it seems, like generals fighting the
last war, have failed to equip themselves to meet the enemy effectively because they have only
the haziest understanding of what they are facing. Symbolic of this ignorance is the figure of
Eddie George, deputy governor of the Bank of England, assuring an interlocutor on the
morning of ʻBlack Wednesdayʼ that “We have got it all under control” (p. 164) - this, at the very
moment when Soros and Druckenmiller were selling the life out of sterling.
One can, of course, hope that not all regulators are as utterly complacent and blindly
conservative as ʻSteady Eddieʼ, and Mallabyʼs book will certainly help to educate any of them
that wish to learn from the errors of the past; he may even succeed in persuading them to leave
hedge funds largely alone in the present. But his book will serve its most important purpose if it
stimulates them anew to ask where they should look in the present for clues to the future. Was
the ʻquant quakeʼ of August 2007 really a public policy non-event, as Mallaby tends to suggest
(pp. 345-347)? In a financial era increasingly dominated by ʻfly-by-wireʼ technology, symbolized
by the magic algorithms of Renaissance Technologies, will the human pilots of the system have
either the time or the skill to intervene to prevent the next crash? It is the central virtue of
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Mallabyʼs study of the past that one is led to ask questions of this kind about the future.
(Professor at Reitaku University)
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